In this episode, we discuss Prof. Moore’s work on the long-term effects of the crack cocaine epidemic:
“Guns and Violence: The Enduring Impact of Crack Cocaine Markets on Young Black Males” by William N. Evans, Craig Garthwaite, and Timothy J. Moore.
Amid a historic rise in gun violence, debates about the underlying factors driving the surge in Chicago have grown to include electronic monitoring (EM), a condition of pretrial release that equips people who have been arrested and assigned to EM with a GPS-monitored ankle bracelet while awaiting trial from home instead of jail. However, the lack of easily accessible public data makes it difficult for all sides to agree on the basic facts about EM and its potential effects on public safety. Analysis of the data we’ve received from the Cook County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) allows us to ground the debate about EM in a few essential takeaways: for one, it’s an oversimplification to say that EM is driving gun violence in Chicago, given the timing of the relevant changes in the justice system and the small number of people arrested for gun violence while out on EM compared to overall victimizations. Nonetheless, the makeup of who is on EM has changed over the past few years: while the largest increase in the use of EM was for gun possession offenses, the number of people on EM for a homicide or shooting is also much higher than it was in 2016. We also see in the data that people out on EM are themselves victims of violence at a much higher rate than others in the city, suggesting that there’s more to be done to connect people on EM to helpful social services. In any data analysis, there are numerous details about both the data and analytical methods that can be important for understanding the nuances of what the data can and can’t tell us, as well as reasonable alternative choices about how to analyze the data, interpret and present the results, and address some of the limitations of the data themselves. Because of the space constraints in the article, we have omitted many of those details and sensitivity analyses from the published version. We provide those additional details here.
In this episode, we discuss their work on how to reduce gun violence:
“Predicting and Preventing Gun Violence: An Experimental Evaluation of READI Chicago” by Monica P. Bhatt, Sara B. Heller, Max Kapustin, Marianne Bertrand, and Christopher Blattman.
“Cure Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence” by Jeffrey Butts, Caterina Gouvis Roman, Lindsay Bostwick, and Jeremy R. Porter.
“Machine Learning Can Predict Shooting Victimization Well Enough to Help Prevent It” by Sara B Heller, Benjamin Jakubowski, Zubin Jelveh, and Max Kapustin.
“The Enhanced Transitional Jobs Demonstration: Implementation and Early Impacts of the Next Generation of Subsidized Employment Programs” by Cindy Redcross, Bret Barden, Dan Bloom, Joseph Broads, Jennifer Thompson, Sonya Williams, Sam Elkins, Randall Jurus, Janae Bonus, Ada Tso et al.
“Thinking, Fast and Slow? Some Field Experiments to Reduce Crime and Dropout in Chicago” by Sara B. Heller, Anuj K. Shah, Jonathan Guryan, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Harold A. Pollack.
“Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia” by Christopher Blattman, Julian C. Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan.
“Reducing Violence Without Police: A Review of Research Evidence” by Charles Branas, Shani Bugs, Jeffrey A. Butts, Anna Harvey, and Erin M. Kerrison.
“Advance Peace Stockton, 2018-20 Evaluation Report” by Jason Corburn and Amanda Fukutome.
“Implementation Evaluation of Roca, Inc.” by Abt Associates.
“Reaching and Connecting: Preliminary Results from Chicago CRED’s Impact on Gun Violence Involvement” by Northwestern Neighborhood & Network Initiative.
Gun violence is the most pressing public safety problem in U.S. cities. We report results from a randomized controlled trial (N = 2,456) of a community-researcher partnership called the Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI) Chicago. The program offered an 18-month job alongside cognitive behavioral therapy and other social support. Both algorithmic and human referral methods identified men with strikingly high scope for gun violence reduction: for every 100 people in the control group, there were 11 shooting and homicide victimizations during the 20-month outcome period. Fifty-five percent of the treatment group started programming, comparable to take-up rates in programs for people facing far lower mortality risk. After 20 months, there is no statistically significant change in an index combining three measures of serious violence, the study’s primary outcome. Yet there are signs that this program model has promise. One of the three measures, shooting and homicide arrests, declined 65% (p = .13 after multiple-testing adjustment). Because shootings are so costly, READI generated estimated social savings between 182,000 and 916,000 per participant (p = .03), implying a benefit-cost ratio between 4:1 and 18:1. Moreover, participants referred by outreach workers—a prespecified subgroup—saw enormous declines in arrests and victimizations for shootings and homicides (79% and 43%, respectively) which remain statistically significant even after multiple-testing adjustments. These declines are concentrated among outreach referrals with higher predicted risk, suggesting that human and algorithmic targeting may work better together.
As our review of the existing literature demonstrated, there is very little scientific evidence available to support the decisions that policymakers and the public must make about whether to implement or change various gun policies. Without strong scientific evidence, policymakers and the public rely heavily on what advocates or social scientists believe the effects of policies are most likely to be. The opinions of these gun policy experts are an important influence on gun policy debates and decisions because people believe that the experts have an especially well-informed understanding of the gun polices under consideration, how similar laws have performed historically, and how specific policies would affect particular stakeholder groups.
Different communities of gun policy experts have sharply divided views on many gun policies, as often becomes clear in the debates that occur when states and the federal government consider new gun legislation. Less clear is whether there are laws or policies for which such differences are less stark, or whether there may be a combination of policies that experts of every stripe could regard as an improvement over existing policies. Finally, it has not been clear whether experts disagree about which objectives gun policies should be trying to achieve or whether experts agree on the objectives but disagree on which policies are most likely to achieve those objectives. If the experts chiefly disagree on the latter, this suggests a role for new and better scientific study of the true effects of gun policies.
To begin to answer these questions, RAND researchers surveyed 173 gun policy experts (across two fieldings in 2016 and 2020) on what they believed the effects of the following 19 gun policies would be on ten different outcomes.
This paper examines the impact of high-fatality school shootings on the subsequent outcomes of the survivors of those events. We focus specifically on the shootings at Columbine High School (Littleton, CO), Sandy Hook Elementary (Newtown, CT), and Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School (Parkland, FL). We assess the subsequent educational record, including attendance and test scores, and the long-term health consequences of surviving students. In all analyses, we treat the timing and location of these events as random, enabling us to identify causal effects. Our results indicate that these high-fatality school shootings led to substantial reductions in attendance and test scores. These educational effects appear to be larger than the effects of shootings with fewer fatalities estimated by others. Children who survived the Columbine shooting were more likely to die by age 30, particularly among boys. They experienced higher levels of suicide and accidental poisonings (overdoses).
Handgun waiting periods are laws that impose a delay between the initiation of a purchase and final acquisition of a firearm. We show that waiting periods, which create a “cooling off” period among buyers, significantly reduce the incidence of gun violence. We estimate the impact of waiting periods on gun deaths, exploiting all changes to state-level policies in the Unites States since 1970. We find that waiting periods reduce gun homicides by roughly 17%. We provide further support for the causal impact of waiting periods on homicides by exploiting a natural experiment resulting from a federal law in 1994 that imposed a temporary waiting period on a subset of states.
There have been dozens of high-profile mass shootings in recent decades. This paper presents three main findings about the impact of mass shootings on gun policy. First, mass shootings evoke large policy responses. A single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within a state in the year after a mass shooting. This effect increases with the extent of media coverage. Second, mass shootings account for a small portion of all gun deaths, but have an outsized influence relative to other homicides. Third, when looking at bills that were actually enacted into law, the impact of mass shootings depends on the party in power. The annual number of laws that loosen gun restrictions doubles in the year following a mass shooting in states with Republican-controlled legislatures. We find no significant effect of mass shootings on laws enacted when there is a Democrat-controlled legislature, nor do we find a significant effect of mass shootings on the enactment of laws that tighten gun restrictions.
While the social costs of gun violence are high, opponents of gun restrictions argue that gun ownership deters crime and creates a positive externality by increasing unobserved risk to criminals. This paper investigates the evidence for these two deterrence channels, exploiting the sudden disclosure of all handgun permit holders’ names and addresses in two New York counties. Permit holders have more crime incidents at their homes relative to non-permit holders in the baseline, which is not driven by selection into neighborhoods. I find little evidence in favor of direct deterrence, and little evidence of peer deterrence. Instead, I find that victimization is associated with a higher likelihood of future gun ownership.